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ABSTRACT
A key component in protecting a nation’s critical infrastructure and key 
resources is the security of control systems. The term industrial control system 
refers to supervisory control and data acquisition, process control, distributed 
control, and any other systems that control, monitor, and manage the nation’s 
critical infrastructure. Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) consists 
of electric power generators, transmission systems, transportation systems, dam 
and water systems, communication systems, chemical and petroleum systems, 
and other critical systems that cannot tolerate sudden interruptions in service. 
Simply stated, a control system gathers information and then performs a function 
based on its established parameters and the information it receives. The patch 
management of industrial control systems software used in CIKR is inconsistent 
at best and nonexistent at worst. Patches are important to resolve security 
vulnerabilities and functional issues. This report recommends patch management 
practices for consideration and deployment by industrial control systems asset 
owners.
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1Recommended Practice for Patch Management of 
Control Systems 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A single solution does not exist that adequately addresses the patch management processes of both 
traditional information technology (IT) data networks and industrial control systems (ICSs). While IT 
patching typically requires relatively frequent downtime to deploy critical patches, any sudden or 
unexpected downtime of ICSs can have serious operational consequences. As a result, there are more 
stringent requirements for patch validation prior to implementation in ICS networks. The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program (CSSP) recognizes that control systems 
owners/operators should have an integrated plan that identifies a separate approach to patch management 
for ICS. This document specifically identifies issues and recommends practices for ICS patch 
management in order to strengthen overall ICS security. 
1.1 Background 
ICSs are deployed and used worldwide, spanning multiple industries and sectors. The advent, 
deployment, and maturity of universal communication protocols such as the Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) allow previously isolated control systems to be easily and 
economically joined, thus creating large integrated systems. The rapid pace of this evolution has allowed 
existing IT cyber security issues to span into control systems, resulting in cross-sector issues that now 
affect all ICS users.  
Patches for ICS, particularly legacy systems, are typically applied either late or not at all. Some 
legacy systems are not patched due to their service age, proprietary nature, perceived obsolescence or 
simply because the patches are unavailable. ICS patches have traditionally addressed functionality and 
stability issues within the original code rather than enhance security.  
Isolated legacy systems have historically operated under the illusion of security through obscurity—if 
a system has not been exploited to date, why would it be targeted now? While awareness of 
vulnerabilities within these systems has increased, so has the interconnectivity between legacy and newer 
architectures. In the past, if a single ICS component on a segregated system failed, it could be easily 
traced, isolated, shutdown, and repaired. Today, with the advent of increased network communications, a 
single ICS component compromise could lead to a much larger cascading failure in adjacent networked 
systems by allowing unintended, exploitable access. Tracing and isolating the root cause of system failure 
in networked systems becomes much more difficult with failure leading to potentially far reaching 
consequences.
A few major issues between IT security and ICS security should to be addressed when developing a 
cohesive patch management plan, (see more details in Appendix A). They include: 
? Network integration of ICS 
? Slower patch evolution 
? Differences in patch deployment 
? Abandoned and unmaintained software and hardware 
? Reliable patch information 
? Disclosure of vulnerabilities 
2? Embedded commercial off-the-shelf packages. 
Some industrial sectors require 99.999% or greater ICS uptime. This requirement relates to 5 minutes 
and 35 seconds or less allowable downtime per year for any reason, making unscheduled patching out of 
the question. Other industrial sectors may require patching activities at hundreds of sites, with a large 
number of units at each site, making a quick response difficult.  
To meet these challenges, a cohesive patch management plan must be developed. This plan is most 
effectively created when personnel from IT, IT security, process engineering, operations, and senior 
management are actively involved.  
2. PATCH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
Management policies are codified as plans that direct company procedures. A good patch 
management program includes elements of the following plans: Configuration Management Plan, Patch 
Management Plan, Patch Testing, Backup/Archive Plan, Incident Response Plan, and Disaster Recovery 
Plan. Each of these plans requires input and approval from all affected organizations, with necessary 
direction and support from senior management. 
2.1 Elements of a Good Patch Management Program  
Several key practices or elements are recommended for any good patch management program. These 
elements are mentioned in the sections that follow. 
2.1.1 Configuration Management Program 
A configuration management program should consider the following elements:
? The asset owner should maintain a current, functional software code library containing the most 
recent, stable, deployed software versions used in the ICS (including configuration files for switches, 
routers, file servers, database servers, and printers). Controls should prevent unauthorized access or 
changes to operational code. 
? A current hardware inventory of all control systems equipment should be maintained and made 
available to authorized personnel only. This inventory should be cross-referenced to the software 
code library.  
? A current network schematic map locating wiring, junction boxes, and connections for data 
communications should be maintained. 
? Configuration documentation including schematics and inventory lists should be controlled to prevent 
public or casual access. Access, including update capabilities, should be limited to authorized staff. 
? An archive of at least one or more revisions of the older production code should be maintained in a 
separate and secure location. 
? An archive of the software library, hardware inventory, current configuration, and schematics should 
be maintained on a separate server and in a separate physical location than the production system.  
? The policies and procedures related to the configuration management plan are disseminated, 
reviewed, and updated on a periodic basis. 
? It is recommended that a Configuration Control Board be used to monitor, authorize, and control 
changes to the control systems configuration. 
3To review additional references on the configuration management program see “Guide to Industrial 
Control Systems (ICS) Security,” September 2008, National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), 800-82 Final Public Draft, Section 6.2.4, “Configuration Management.” For greater detail see 
“Information Security,” December 2007, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Special 
Publication 800-53, Revision 2, Appendix F-CM. 
2.1.2 Patch Management Plan 
Consideration should be given to several elements in the patch management plan. For example: 
? Vulnerability and exposure reviews should be conducted by personnel knowledgeable of the system 
and its usage in conjunction with those who are accountable for those systems. These reviews should 
be convened to examine vulnerability and exposure when an exploit is identified, or as a preventative 
action when cyber security weaknesses are discovered. These personnel must have the authority to 
decide on the urgency of patching activities. Note: Scheduling of the activity will be a business 
decision.a
? Urgency reviews should be conducted to evaluate the risk to operations and determine if immediate 
action is needed (i.e., patching or implementing a work-around) or if action can be delayed or deemed 
unnecessary at this time. 
? Deployment of patches or other modifications to the system may nullify the ICS warranty, depending 
on the vendor and system. Arrangements should be made with vendors to address this issue before 
patch deployment. 
2.1.3 Backup/Archive Plan 
The asset owner should maintain a current and functional backup/archive. This archive should be 
created and/or updated prior to any patching activities and provides a last, “good” snapshot of the 
functional, production system. The plan should describe: 
? The frequency of the backup 
? The process and functional requirements of creating the archive 
? The backup verification procedures 
? The backup retention period 
? The physical storage (location, duplication, etc.) requirements. 
2.1.4 Patch Testing 
As mentioned earlier, patch testing is of special importance in control systems because of the 
requirement for very high uptime. The following recommendations should be included in patch testingb:
? Test bed/simulation hardware should be dedicated for testing purposes. 
? A testing environment should be created that closely simulates the operational environment and 
allows for software compatibility testing. 
                                                     
a.  A discussion of patch management and patch testing was written by Jason Chan titled “Essentials of Patch Management 
Policy and Practice,” January 31, 2004, and can be found on the PatchManagement.org website, hosted by Shavlik 
Technologies, LLC. 
b.  A white paper written by Nelson Ruest in 2004 for Wise Solutions titled “A Practical Guide for Patch Testing” provides 
additional insight into patch testing and the general information on patch management.  
4? Planned tests should be conducted that verify that the patch fixes the problem (or problems) identified 
by the supporting organization. (This may be difficult if details are not provided by the vendor.) 
? Tests should be conducted to validate that the patch does not cause conflicts with coexisting 
applications on the system. 
? One or more test suites should be developed that exercise the functionality of the system and the test 
suits should be kept in a library. 
? Tests should be conducted, and procedures written, to verify that the installed patch can be removed 
without impacting operations. (Some patches may require immediate removal if testing has been 
inadequate. Backing out of installed patches can be quite difficult, and plans and procedures must be 
developed for critical systems recovery.) 
? Tests should be conducted to verify that the patched application remains functional. This could be the 
System Operational acceptance test (SO test), which could be used to validate operations prior to a 
return to service (see Unit Operations). 
? Checklists and procedures should be used for patching activities to ensure both initial accuracy and 
repeatability of patching activities and testing. 
? Records of the patch, tests, and configuration changes should be logged and documented in the 
configuration management record.  
2.1.5 Incident Response Plan 
The actions defined in the incident response plan will often initiate the patching process. Where 
vendors are out-of-business or do not effectively publish vulnerabilities that might affect their systems, it 
is necessary to find and identify incidents applicable to the ICS. Within the context of patch management, 
several aspects of the incident response plan can be useful, including the following: 
? Define a scheduled discovery process to identify new vulnerabilities and their impact to ICS 
? Identify if patches and/or workarounds are available to mitigate the vulnerability 
? Establish a procedure to alert the Configuration Control Board to review the discovered vulnerability 
and its impact to operations 
? Develop procedures to either report an incident or provide feedback on any issues discovered in the 
patch process. 
A number of incident response organizations provide guidance and information on exploits, patches, 
and how to develop an effective incident response plan.c
2.1.6 Disaster Recovery Plan 
The disaster recovery pland is critical if the patch impedes system functionality and cannot be 
successfully removed. (In the past, this plan was designed for physical disasters; however, it can be 
                                                     
c.  The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed a Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (SP 
800-61), which provides guidance to security personnel in developing an incident response procedure.  
 US-CERT has extensive information and reporting capabilities available for any control system security incident. This 
report is located at http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems (Control Systems Cyber Security: Defense-in-Depth Strategies,
May 2006, INL/EXT-06-11478, p. 25). US-CERT also issued an official charter for companies creating an internal incident 
response plan. Details of how to build the plan and the related team within your company are available at Carnegie Mellon’s 
security response site: www.cert.org/csirts/Creating-A-CSIRT.html (Processor, June 1, 2007, Vol 29, Issue 22, p. 13). 
 ISA has developed a draft version of guidelines addressing incident planning and response, among other subjects. See ISA-
d99.02.01, “Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems,” Draft 4, Edit 5, September 2008, pp. 36–37. 
5effective in system recovery for severe cyber attack or patch recovery, and should include planning to 
encompass both physical and cyber requirements.) Recommendations for the disaster recovery plan 
include the following: 
? A good practice is to have a test bed and simulator equipped with working hardware, located at an 
offsite location. In addition to supporting operational testing, this facility can have a secondary 
mission of being available as a disaster recovery facility. It is important that functional 
backup/archive restoration equipment and media be available for restoration.  
? It is recommended that organizations track how long it takes to restore backups or archived images as 
some archives may take a day or more to restore. It is also important to verify that the backup data 
and image restoration functions work in real-world situations. This can be tested by using the last 
restoration point archive to create the test bed and simulation test environment.  
2.1.7 Unit Patching Operations: 
An ideal situation consists of multiple identical units in production, with one or more units in standby 
or backup mode. This scenario allows patching activities to be conducted with negligible impact on 
operations. Other types of scenarios exist, such as rolling patches, sequential patches, or situations where 
all units must be patched simultaneously. The mechanics of how to perform these different types of unit 
patches can be found in sector specific documentation.e Also, see Appendix B for more information on 
unit patching. The following should be considered for unit patching: 
? SO tests can be conducted on this backup/standby unit. Most SO tests have identified specific 
functions that must be tested to validate the code prior to a return to operations, and these tests should 
be documented in the configuration management record and archived as documents supporting the 
decision to return to operations. 
? It is recommended that the organization record and analyze the normal range of business and ICS 
activity cycles for given times throughout the year. This is useful when making decisions on when to 
implement patches with the least impact on operations. 
When the resources of each plan are integrated and leveraged together, they support each other, 
thereby maximizing their effectiveness.  
2.2 Specific Evaluation Issues 
As identified earlier, priority and concerns of IT, IT security, process engineering, production 
operations, and senior management are not the same. When an exploit is identified, all these groups must 
coordinate requirements and constraints to determine the level of risk associated with the vulnerability 
and the organizations tolerance for that risk. An analysis method is discussed in the next section, but the 
following general issues should to be considered when developing a patch management program: 
? How vulnerable is the ICS to this threat? 
? What are the potential impacts? 
? What is the urgency to deploy mitigation actions (patches or work-arounds)?  
? What is the effect on operations from unscheduled downtime? 
                                                                                                                                                                          
d. A general overview of disaster recovery and related planning can be found in Chapter 11, “Preparing for Contingencies and 
Disasters,” in the publication “An Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST Handbook,” National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), Special Publication 800-12. 
e. Additional information can be found in “Security Guidelines for the Petroleum Industry,” Third Edition, April 2005, 
copyright 2005 – American Petroleum Institute. 
6? What is the effect on operations from patch activities? 
? What are the patch dependencies with other patches or operating system versions? 
? Would no action be an acceptable action? 
? Would an effective work-around provide better or more immediate temporary protection than a patch 
deployment? 
? Can the ICS be easily and quickly segregated from the normal office data network? (These systems 
were originally designed to be isolated, so a return to a dedicated ICS isolated network may be 
acceptable in the short term.) 
? Can the network be upgraded to provide better segregation of the ICS? For example, could hardware 
or software be upgraded to provide the needed functionality?  
? Is it time to retire the old system and redesign or upgrade to a newer system? 
All necessary security and operational personnel should voice their issues and concerns to determine 
an acceptable unified method of response. The final result of this evaluation should be the 
recommendation to senior management to patch or not patch the ICS. This could be formally organized as 
a responsibility of the Configuration Control Board. 
3. PATCHING ANALYSIS 
3.1 Vulnerability Analysis 
Vulnerability analysis, in relation to patch management, is the process of determining when and if a 
patch should be applied to the ICS. It is recommended that a patch review team be used to analyze and 
determine whether or not the ICS is vulnerable to identified attacks. A method used to determine if a 
control system is vulnerable to an identified attack is through the use of the “vulnerability footprint,” also 
known as the attack surface.  
The vulnerability footprint consists of four subjective, primary elements (Impact, Exposure, 
Deployment, and Simplicity) that create a graphical representation of the vulnerability footprint in the 
shape of a diamond (see Figure 1). The larger the physical size of the footprint, the more vulnerable the 
ICS is to attack and the more urgent it becomes to mitigate that vulnerability. The relative shape of the 
diamond gives a graphical sense of key risk factors, where larger parts of the diamond correspond to a 
greater impact to risk. Figure 1 shows Medium Deployment, High Exposure, Medium Impact, and Low 
Simplicity. The highest vulnerability is Exposure from unauthenticated outside attacks.  
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This example is a heap-based 
protocol server overflow that 
allows remote attackers to cause 
a denial of service (crash) and 
possibly execute arbitrary code 
via a crafted request for a WSDL 
file that causes a strncpy call.  In 
this example, Deployment is 
Medium (other SCADA systems 
are vulnerable to attack from the 
first system), the Exposure is High 
(vulnerability from remote, 
unauthenticated attackers), the 
Impact is Medium (attacker can 
cause a denial-of-service attack), 
and Simplicity is Low (details of 
the exploit had not yet been 
published).  
Figure 1. Example of a vulnerability footprint 
US-CERT publishes a quarterly report of known vulnerabilities applicable to ICS configurations, 
including the vulnerability footprint. A published example of a vulnerability footprint shown in Figure 1 
has typical information related to critical infrastructure control systems—in this case, a real-world 
recorded incident. 
Asset owners can use the information provided in the Department of Homeland Security “Quarterly 
Report on Cyber Vulnerabilities of Potential Risk to Control Systems” as an analytical source, and apply 
their unique vulnerability assessment process to obtain an asset owner specific ICS vulnerability 
footprint. More detailed information on this analysis process and how it can be used by the asset owner is 
provided in Appendix C. This analytical approach is useful in understanding the vulnerability profile, and 
can provide a basis for prioritizing mitigation efforts. 
The rest of this section describes how an asset owner can implement this process based on the 
following scenario: 
The asset owner has seven remote communications systems tied to industrial controls with only 
one of seven server systems using a vendor unique protocol. A web search for vulnerabilities 
relating to this protocol will list a number of sites, but references to US-CERT web pages listing 
Vulnerability Notes information or NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD) Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)-id information will provide the most reliable data. US-
CERT Vulnerability Notes describe the issue, impacts, solutions, and the CVE number for that 
particular vulnerability. For this example we will use an actual CVE listing detailing the 
description, the impact to users, and the recommended solution.f
                                                     
f. Additional US-CERT vulnerability information, which can be found in the NVD, are based on the CVE naming standard, 
and are organized according to severity determined by the Common Vulnerability Scoring System Version 2 (CVSSv2) 
standard. The division of high, medium, and low severities corresponds to the following scores: 
? High—Vulnerabilities will be labeled “High” if they have a CVSS base score of 7.0–10.0 
? Medium—Vulnerabilities will be labeled “Medium” if they have a CVSS base score of 4.0–6.9 
? Low—Vulnerabilities will be labeled “Low” if they have a CVSS base score of 0.0–3.9. 
83.1.1 Deployment 
A review of the CVE-id among several informational websites reveals that users of a specific version 
of the protocol are vulnerable, while users of later versions are not. A quick inquiry of installed version of 
the protocol on the server would immediately determine whether further action is needed.  
If the unaffected version is installed, all activity can stop because the vulnerability has been 
addressed. If an older version of the protocol is being used, it is vulnerable, and the next action is to 
determine the deployment risk. In this scenario, only one of the seven servers is using the vulnerable 
version of the protocol and a value of “Low” was assigned.  
3.1.2 Exposure 
Review of the US-CERT vulnerability footprint shows the Exposure value as “High” (based on 
unauthenticated access via the network). US-CERT data can be used to determine the ranking directly, or 
the asset owner can derive the ranking after reading the report. This vulnerability ranks high and requires 
immediate action as outside exposure means the ICS is wide open to external internet access. 
3.1.3 Impact 
Assuming that the ability to change general controls or set points does not exist on the system using 
the vulnerable protocol version, the Impact is “Medium.” Another concern with unauthenticated access is 
that all associated networked computer systems (for example, safety and production) are now vulnerable 
to cascading failure effects from this one system. 
3.1.4 Simplicity 
The final analysis will be to determine what skill level is needed to exploit this vulnerability. In our 
example, this exploit requires more advanced knowledge, so the ranking is marked as low. The 
vulnerability footprint for this particular asset owner configuration would now look like Figure 2, with 
Exposure being identified as the greatest risk factor. In this example, US-CERT would recommend that 
the asset owner immediately deploy an updated version of the protocol software. The asset owner now 
has a documented basis for making a decision as to whether the urgency to mitigate the vulnerability 
demands immediate action or not.  
Impact
Deployment
ExposureSimplicity
Figure 2. Specific asset owner vulnerability footprint. 
The flowchart in Figure 3 shows the basic decision process in determining the urgency to patch the 
ICS. A documented process should be in place to monitor new exploits and vulnerabilities. When a 
9vulnerability and patch has been identified, the asset owner should determine if it affects any ICS in the 
operation. If it does affect one or more systems, then a work around or alternative action should be 
considered. If a work around is found, then the patch should be evaluated and scheduled as part of the 
regular patch cycle. If there are no work-arounds, then the patch review team will have to analyze the risk 
associated with the patch. Factors that are considered in the analysis include the key elements of the 
vulnerability footprint measured against the potential impact to the business operations. If the risk is high, 
then an immediate patch may be required. Conversely, if there are strong business constraints or 
operational concerns related to implementing the patch at a specific time, then it may be necessary to hold 
off on patching the system until the scheduled maintenance window. Once the patch has been 
implemented all applicable documentation and patch records should be updated. 
Figure 3. Patch urgency decision tree. 
3.2 Patch Process 
If the urgency determination requires immediate action and a work-around solution is either not 
available or not the best option, then the following actions should to be taken:  
1. Where possible, create a backup/archive and verify its integrity by deploying it on a standby system. 
2. Create a checklist/procedure for patch activities and deploy the patch on the standby system. 
3. Test the patched standby system for operational functionality and compatibility with other resident 
applications.
4. Swap the patched standby system into production and keep the previous unpatched production system 
as a standby for emergency patch regression. 
5. Closely monitor the patched production system for any issues not identified during testing. 
6. Patch the standby system (old production) after confidence is established with the production unit. 
7. Update software configuration management plan and related records. 
Even though it is recommended that a standby system be in place, some sectors may not have a 
requirement for this system. In these cases, at a minimum, there should be a backup and archive 
performed that has been verified for restore capability. 
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If the urgency determination (risk) does not require immediate action, patching may be delayed until 
a more mature and tested service level patch is deployed or an alternative work around is developed. The 
final patch decision may be to wait until the next maintenance cycle outage occurs to update the system. 
Some issues to consider when making the final patch determination are: 
? Can the patch be deployed at a later date within a routine maintenance window? 
? Is there a work-around option that would provide adequate protection without patching?  
? Does the exploit allow an intruder access into other sensitive systems?  
? What is the impact if the entire system had to be reloaded using disaster recovery backup procedures?  
? Does the affected system have to remain in continuous operation?  
? Is this a critical system that supports life, health, or commerce?  
? Are other operational modes (e.g., manual) available?  
If the internal staff lacks training, experience, and expertise in evaluating and deploying patches, 
using the services of a managed software service provider may be a more cost effective approach. There 
are several managed software service providers who, as contractors, conduct the tasks of patching, 
configuring, deploying, and restoring systems. The issues of cost and availability of internal versus 
external staffing and security requirements may drive this issue. 
A detailed explanation of the patch process is provided in Appendix B. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The issue of timely ICS security patching is a serious cross-sector issue. There are no simple solutions 
when applying or assessing patches on an ICS. The first critical step in resolving these issues is to initiate 
open communications between IT, IT security, process engineering, production, and senior management. 
Only then will major stakeholders be aware of all concerns confronting cyber security issues allowing a 
coherent path forward to be created. This document has identified resources that provide additional 
information on cyber threats, vulnerabilities, self-assessment tools and recommended practices that may 
be used to incorporate ICS patch management processes into existing IT security plans. 
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management, security measurement, and compliance (e.g., Federal Information Security Management 
Act).
http://www.cert.org/other_sources/viruses.html. Computer virus resources hosted by Software 
Engineering Institute and Carnegie Mellon for US-CERT. 
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http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/ST04-009.html. US-CERT website National Cyber Alert System (Cyber 
Security Tip ST04-009) Identifying Hoaxes and Urban Legends, this site also lists recommended 
websites specializing in validating information on hoaxes and urban legends. 
http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/index.html. US-CERT CSSP homepage, containing information 
on cyber threats, vulnerabilities, self-assessment tools, and recommended practices. 
http://csrp.inl.gov/Introduction.html. US-CERT recommended practices web page. 
http://www.ciac.org/ciac/index.html. Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC) has been providing 
the U.S. Department of Energy with incident response, reporting, and tracking, along with other 
computer security support since 1989. CIAC is a founding member of Government FIRST and FIRST 
an international incident response and security organization. 
http://vil.mcafee.com/hoax.asp. Security firm McAfee lists information on viruses, fixes, and patches. 
This particular site lists a number of computer hoaxes in circulation. McAfee cautions that while 
some issues originate as hoaxes, they can be repackaged to deploy exploits.  
http://www.snopes.com/computer/virus/virus.htm. Urban legends and some virus information. 
http://cve.mitre.org/about/index.html. CVE Website. 
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/index.html. National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
Computer Security Division, and Computer Security Resource Center homepage. 
http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?version=2. CVSSv2 website. 
http://www.cert.org/csirts/Creating-A-CSIRT.html. CERT Computer Security Incident Response Team 
process.
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/. FIRST member that tracks and identifies vulnerabilities, patches, 
and other incident response teams.  
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bb977553.aspx. Microsoft website that contains a number of 
security and compliance guides. Covers client, server, network and general security planning and 
guidance for recommended cyber security. 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/current.aspx. Microsoft security bulletin search page. Find 
general and technical information about released Microsoft patches relating to vulnerability, update, 
detection, deployment tools and guidance as well as CVE references. 
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Appendix A—Issues 
The cyber security and operational issues that should be considered in developing a cohesive patch 
management plan include: network integration of industrial control systems, slower patch evolution, 
differences between information technology (IT) and industrial control system (ICS) patch deployment 
cycles, abandoned and unmaintained software and hardware, impact to system operations, impact to 
support mechanisms, impact to vendor warranties and support, reliability of patch/vulnerability 
information, and the disclosure of vulnerabilities. 
The organization most frequently tasked with patching activities is the IT department, which provides 
ICS cyber security support. It typically delegates ICS patching responsibilities to process engineering 
departments. Many IT and control systems departments identify funding and resources as limiting factors 
to maintaining a dedicated ICS test bed/simulator facility. As an alternative to in-house simulators, ICS 
vendors are now offering test bed simulations as part of the services they provide. 
 Because maintenance windows are small and approval to patch is difficult to get, the need for testing 
patches and verifying stability on a test bed/simulator before installation is significant. As a result of these 
issues, ICS patches tend to be applied late or not at all for fear of causing unscheduled downtime.
The lack of communications between IT, IT security, process engineering, and senior management, 
concerning ICS security, can contribute to lack of understanding and awareness of the patch management 
process leading to slow ICS patch implementation. Asset owners with excellent intradepartmental 
communications tend to have more proactive patching programs in place and see patching activities as 
preventative maintenance to their manufacturing process. 
IT departments tend to focus primarily on data and defense-in-depth from unauthorized intruders 
from outside the outer protection perimeter. Traditional IT defenses consist of firewalls, intrusion 
detection systems/intrusion protection systems, routing access control lists, workstation and server 
policies, antivirus and other host based protection technologies, limited user privileges, and robust patch 
management programs. The primary focus is to keep unauthorized individuals from accessing corporate 
cyber systems, stealing or corrupting data and resources, and causing malicious system behavior. 
However, some ICS operations utilize additional communication channels (modems/WAN access), or 
other protective equipment that IT departments may not be aware of or may not have configured or 
deployed correctly. Traditional IT security priorities are based on Confidentiality (authorized access), 
Integrity (accuracy of data), and Availability (system uptime), which does not necessarily translate to the 
priorities of ICS. 
ICS operations are discovering that standard IT security patching and upgrade activities are frequently 
incompatible with operational concerns. For example, standard IT security activities may require reboot 
cycles that can cause ICS failure. Many ICS operations demand 99.999% or greater operation/availability 
uptime. This requirement implies that downtime due to scheduled or unscheduled patching/upgrades 
activities becomes unacceptable. Security priorities for ICSs are typically Availability, Integrity, then 
Confidentiality, which is the inverse of traditional IT priorities. 
Network Integration of Industrial Control Systems 
Most existing legacy ICS were designed as proprietary, robust, stand-alone systems, with the highest 
priority being reliability and longevity. Most were not designed with integrated network access control 
and security capabilities. These legacy systems met, or are now meeting, their original design 
considerations of reliability and longevity (20–30 years in some cases) and will continue to function until 
reaching end-of-life failure (mechanical, technical, or economic). Improvements and advances in data 
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communications and interoperability have allowed isolated systems to be integrated into large control 
systems, thus increasing the life of stand-alone legacy systems far beyond their original design. The main 
drivers of this effort have been reduced cost and increased efficiency through automation. Due to this 
increased longevity, ICS configurations continue to operate, often using old, unsupported software. 
Slower Patch Evolution 
The exposure and impact of ICS security exploits have raised awareness to the extent that newer ICS 
vendors are mitigating vulnerabilities by increasing the frequency, testing, and deployment of patches, 
thus securing the ICS against new exploits. However, patches for ICS legacy components, which have 
traditionally focused on resolving operational issues rather than security issues, are being developed at a 
much slower rate than new ICS. Some factors that contribute to the lack of legacy ICS patching are as 
follows:
? ICS-specific vulnerabilities are not fully understood or widely known 
? Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) no longer support some legacy systems 
? Asset owners may not have renewed service level agreements with OEM on legacy systems 
? Asset owners and vendors may not be aware of embedded ICS vulnerabilities 
? OEM and asset owners may lack the experience or knowledge to create and test security patches 
? ICS patches require extensive operational testing prior to deployment to verify functional operation 
and compatibility with coexisting applications 
? Funds and resources may not be available to resolve known vulnerabilities 
? Some patches may have problems because of configuration and compatibility issues with obsolete 
unsupported operating systems 
? Operational demands impact the allowable maintenance window for patch deployment. 
Differences in Patch Deployment 
ICS patching is different from desktop IT systems in several ways. Typically, ICS cannot support 
unscheduled service interruptions, and when they are scheduled for maintenance and patching, these 
interruptions are often short and may occur only once over a multiyear cycle. ICS patches must therefore 
have extensive operational testing before being deployed and have an approved maintenance window 
before being granted approval to proceed with the actual patching evolution. In some sectors, vendors 
have provided extensive testing assistance to asset owners; in other cases, patching a system may 
jeopardize contractual agreements.  
Many companies incorrectly assign all computer patch management responsibilities to the IT 
department with the expectation that all cyber security related operational issues will be addressed. For 
the reasons stated above, this may not be a good practice because IT, IT Security, process engineers, and 
production operations have different priorities as well as different functional requirements. It is important 
that IT departments share cyber security responsibilities with other stakeholders. Some reasons include: 
? Standard office IT policies frequently automate nightly patch/software upgrade deployment on 
desktop systems, requiring frequent rebooting, which may not be consistent with ICS operational 
requirements. 
? Urgent, IT office-type, patches sometimes require immediate unscheduled shutdown and deployment. 
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? IT patches may or may not be tested for functionality and compatibility with legacy systems deployed 
in the ICS environment or with collocated applications. For example severe ICS disruptions occurred 
when Microsoft Windows XP, Service Pack 2 was deployed. 
There are many incident organizations, such as United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 
(US-CERT), Army CERT (ACERT), Air Force CERT (AFCERT), and Forum of Incident Response and 
Security Teams (FIRST), which are becoming aware of the differences ICS presents to cyber security. 
However, regulations and these support organizations specializing in IT security are not uniformly 
addressing cyber issues and resolutions on ICS security. US-CERT supports and documents 
recommended practices for ICS security (http://csrp.inl.gov/Introduction.html), which are located on the 
US-CERT Control Systems Security Program (CSSP) website (http://www.us-
cert.gov/control_systems/index.html).
Abandoned and Unmaintained Software and Hardware 
Legacy systems also have issues when OEM ICS component companies cease to exist and support for 
these systems becomes problematic. Over time, older systems are frequently removed from software and 
hardware maintenance, thereby removing legal access to software and hardware upgrades and patches. 
Return-to-service fees can be expensive, if available, and both IT and the process engineers may not have 
the expertise to maintain legacy systems.  
A common misconception is to inherently trust patches from the OEM without verification. If the 
OEM is not known or unavailable, or the ICS component contains hidden features or functions, the 
responsibility for timely patches and issue resolution is unclear. As new vulnerabilities on these 
unsupported systems are identified, creating, testing, and issuing patches and acquiring financial and legal 
responsibilities associated with third party patches can be problematic, if available. 
Third party vendors provide valuable patching services and expertise, but new issues of unscrupulous 
entities packaging malware with legitimate patches is emerging. Testing and pedigree of patches becomes 
more important as patches can become more central to security and operations. In some cases it may be 
more economical to remove the existing system from service and upgrade or replace it than to obtain, test, 
verify, and deploy third party patches. 
Reliable Patch Information 
Understanding and knowing the components within the production ICS is important when assessing 
system vulnerability and exposure. The issue is to understand and recognize the need for a patch and then 
formulate the proper response. 
IT administrators frequently use a number of websites in addition to OEM notices to verify if 
virus/patch alerts are legitimate: 
? http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/ST04-009.html,
? http://www.ciac.org/ciac/index.html
? http://vil.mcafee.com/hoax.asp
? http://www.snopes.com/computer/virus/virus.htm.
ICS asset owners can use similar sources of currently known vulnerabilities and mitigation 
resolutions published and maintained in US-CERT’s Vulnerability Notes. These sites contain reliable 
information about known exploits, validated and recommended resolutions, and/or patch locations. In 
particular, CVE Control System information is available in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). 
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The ICS websites are as follows: 
? http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/
? http://www.cert.org/other_sources/viruses.html
? http://nvd.nist.gov/home.cfm
Disclosure of Vulnerabilities 
In an ideal situation, security researchers or ICS users would, upon discovering a security 
vulnerability, contact and disclose it to the vendor. The vendor would then act immediately to resolve the 
vulnerability by creating and thoroughly testing a patch, and then disseminate the patch to the vendor’s 
customers. In actual practice, some vendors are not responsive and vulnerabilities may remain in the ICS 
indefinitely. As a result, security researcher may publish the exploit in an attempt to cause the vendors to 
address the vulnerability. 
The timely public disclosure of vulnerabilities constitutes a double-edged sword. While public alerts 
of vulnerabilities in exposed systems motivate asset owners and vendors to address these issues, these 
alerts also flag potential attackers that system vulnerabilities exist. This allows attackers a window of 
opportunity to act immediately, while the asset owners need time to evaluate the vulnerability, resolve the 
issue, and test the patch.
This dilemma can be addressed as asset owners demand action from vendors to resolve issues as soon 
as they are disclosed. As the vendors do so, there will be no need for public disclosure resulting in 
increased security provided by timely patches and a lack of public awareness of the vulnerability.g
Embedded Commercial Off-the-Shelf Software 
Asset owners rarely know exactly what embedded components and services exist inside their control 
systems. The current business trend is to use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and standard 
operating systems whenever possible to simplify maintenance, operations, and procurement costs. Newer 
COTS product components are frequently delivered with unknown and undocumented services, such as 
FTP and web-based maintenance, which can provide unknown access points for an exploit. In some older 
systems, a common password was included in the device that cannot be changed. In some newer systems, 
asset owners do not change default passwords even though the ability exists. 
Most ICS components use real-time operating systems (RTOS), which are small, simple computer 
systems intended for real-time applications. The use of these simple components is widespread, and they 
are in common use in control system architectures. A few examples include: pressure control valves, 
voltage regulator, programmable thermostats, appliance controllers, industrial controls and scientific 
research equipment (legacy oscilloscopes). The complexity of components with these embedded systems 
range from simple single-processor chips to very high numbers of integrated units within a single 
component.  
A correctly configured component should only run necessary tasks specified by the operation, but 
older legacy systems may have any number of active unused services that may not be disabled or blocked. 
These active unused services and communications ports within the ICS component present a cyber 
security issue. Most ICS devices that can communicate or allow upgrade of its firmware code must 
contain an embedded RTOS. It is impossible to patch and secure ICS components if embedded 
                                                     
g. US-CERT does provide guidance on ICS vulnerabilities located at http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/csvuls.html.
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capabilities are not known or understood by the cyber security team. In addition, embedded capabilities of 
ICS components are not typically addressed in an asset owner’s operational configuration security review. 
Embedded COTS applications that exist within custom solutions present an additional level of 
complexity. They may require patches that are incompatible with the custom application, causing the 
component to fail. This requires a greater degree of awareness, testing, and planning in the patch 
management process. 
Vendor Involvement 
In many cases, patching or modifying of ICS components without notifying and/or involving the 
vendor can nullify the system warranty. In the process of patch planning, the issues of warranty, vendor 
responsibilities, and liabilities must be considered. Ideally, a “trusted” relationship with the vendor should 
be established to address both anticipated and unanticipated patching issues.
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Appendix B—Unit Patch Process 
A vulnerability must be reviewed by information technology (IT), IT security, process engineering, 
operations, and senior management (Configuration Control Board or CCB) to determine if there is an 
immediate need to patch the industrial control system (ICS). If the decision is made not to patch at this 
time, patch planning/testing documentation should be maintained to support future patch planning. 
The information that follows provides an example of the steps to take in an ideal situation. There are 
other approaches available, depending on the sector requirements, ICS architecture, operational needs, 
and type of patching (other types include rolling, sequential, and simultaneous). 
System Patching 
If the CCB approves the maintenance window for this activity, proceed with the patch. If an asset 
owner has a redundant ICS with units in cold or hot standby status, it is always recommended to patch the 
cold standby units first.  
? Backup or Standby Units. A good practice would be to have one or more completely identical 
systems located at separate locations cycling between operational, standby, and backup status. If 
redundant standby units are not available, the next best option is to have a working, stable software 
backup or archive and a representative test bed available for patch testing. If a test bed is not 
available, it becomes absolutely essential to have a working backup or archive system in place before 
any patch activities take place. This archive is the last chance to create a known recovery point of the 
stable operational environment. In the event that none of the recommended options are available, the 
alternative is to patch on the operational system, which may be an acceptable risk-based approach to 
mitigate the vulnerability. The criticality of the system being patched and its downtime tolerance must 
be carefully considered before patching directly on the production system. 
? Backup Patch. In the event of multiple redundant systems, an approved and tested patch should be 
applied first to the units not in production. For organizations that have multiple production units, the 
recommended patch management process is to patch the backup units prior to patching the production 
or hot standby units. The normal risk management process is to minimize the risk prior to 
implementation on the production unit. 
? Operational Stability. Organizations should establish criteria for benchmarking stability. Based upon 
this established criteria, the newly patched system must be monitored and evaluated for stable 
operations. The previous unpatched operational unit should not be patched at this time, serving as an 
emergency standby unit.  
? Production. After the operational criterion is achieved in establishing production stability on the 
backup system, the organization is now ready to implement the patch on the production unit. The 
original production unit should then be patched and tested, now becoming the backup to the 
operational production system (see Figure C-1). The final step is to document and update the 
configuration management plan to include system modifications and the deployed patch update 
information. 
A sample flow chart identifying patching operations is presented in Figure C-1. 
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around
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arounds
Swap into production
Patch former production 
units
Update configuration 
management plans
Figure C-1. Flow chart of patching operations. 
Issues to Consider 
The following issues should be considered when creating the patch management plan and the 
processes and policies related to it: 
? Testing. It is always recommended that organizations duplicate the operations environment with 
absolute functional fidelity, but issues associated with component cost and test space may limit the 
ability of the organization to have a fully functional test unit. For some scenarios it is adequate to 
simulate application functions without absolute system replication fidelity. For example, testing 
nuclear reactor safety systems or flight control systems demands more fidelity than simulating facility 
heating, ventilation, air conditioning systems or simpler ICS applications. The primary function of a 
test bed/simulator is to mitigate risk prior to implementing changes to the operational environment. 
An additional benefit from a test bed/simulator is to allow operator training on new configurations, 
develop checklists, and evaluate procedures prior to deployment on production systems. 
? Archiving. An archive image or data backup of the existing stable operating system should be 
captured before production patching is conducted to create a valid restoration point. It is 
recommended that the organization backup the operational system and restore it on the test 
bed/simulator system. This activity helps validate that the restore point is usable for disaster recovery. 
Backup/archiving is frequently done in operations, but the attempt to restore this backup to a working 
stable environment is frequently only done when needed in a disaster. 
? Rollback. Depending upon the patch, a contingency plan should be developed in the event the 
patching process corrupts the existing stable environment. On legacy systems and new ICS patch 
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failure or incomplete patching activities can cause expensive physical damage to equipment. A 
recommended contingency practice is to create a recovery point by archiving/imaging the current 
stable system as part of a backup/disaster recovery plan. The organization would then develop and 
test uninstall activities and have hardware spares identified and available (such as power supplies, 
system motherboards, hard drives, communication switch boards, etc.) depending on the criticality of 
the system.
? Contingency. Organizations should consider the worst case scenario in developing contingencies. 
Assuming a worst-case scenario where patch installation does not restore the system to a stable 
condition or patch installation and/or removal activity affects other applications, determine if the 
disaster recovery point restores the system to a stable configuration. An organization should establish 
criteria based upon the systems functionality over a specific duration that incorporates timing 
considerations. It is recommended that organizations know if a patch can be safely and quickly 
removed and how long this evolution takes as a contingency measure. 
A final system operational test plan should be developed to exercise, validate, and document all important 
identified operational and functional testing points of all primary applications running in the same 
environment. This is to ensure stable functional system operations prior to a return to service.  
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Appendix C—Vulnerability Analysis 
The following elements define the vulnerability footprint and can be used by industrial control system 
(ICS) asset owners in determining the vulnerability of their specific ICS configurations: 
? Deployment. This element rating gives the relative proportion of control systems installations having 
critical infrastructure and key resources thought to contain vulnerable configurations at one site. A 
high rating would indicate all, or at least a high number, of deployed ICS at the asset owner’s site are 
affected. A low rating indicates that only a few minor systems are exposed. This rating is important in 
that the answer provides an immediate yes or no determination of whether patching should be done—
does this vulnerability affect the asset owner’s ICS or not? 
? Exposure. This element rating ranks available layers of defense such as defense-in-depth and existing 
adequate barriers (the exploit affects the asset owner’s ICS and is readily available to attackers). A 
high exposure rating indicates that an attacker can gain unauthenticated access to the ICS from 
another less-secure network within the control systems perimeter. A medium rating indicates that an 
attacker can gain unauthenticated remote access. A low rating indicates that an attacker can only gain 
authenticated physical machine/network access. Exposure of the ICS to unauthorized access presents 
significant risk. 
? Impact. A high impact element rating indicates that an exploit is successfully deployed into the wild 
and an attacker can gain full system control. A medium rating indicates that an attacker can obtain 
limited access or gain enough information to launch a denial-of-service attack. A low rating indicates 
that an attacker gains enough information for a preliminary reconnaissance effort on a target system’s 
architecture. Part of the impact assessment must consider cascade effects on safety and protection 
devices. The initial penetration may not be immediately significant, but safety and production 
components could be disabled in the same system 
due to cascade effects from exhaustion of 
computer resources. 
? Simplicity. This rating applies to relative ease of 
the technical exploit. A high rating indicates an 
exploit that is written, available, and only requires 
average or basic computer skills to use (e.g., a 
public script is available to implement the exploit). 
A medium rating indicates that a vulnerability 
exists, but original work needs to be done to use 
the exploit. A low rating indicates that the exploit 
requires a high level of computer skill and subject 
matter knowledge. 
                                                     
h.  http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/bulletins/SB08-203.html—Cyber Security Bulletin SB08-203, July 14, 2008 
The “Quarterly Report on Cyber Vulnerabilities of 
Potential Risk to Control Systems” is prepared by Idaho 
National Laboratory for the Department of Homeland 
Security Control Systems Security Program. This report 
provides detailed information, such as identification, 
vulnerability footprint, description, analysis of known 
exploits and recommended remediation information. The 
abstract of this report gives a summary of the numbers 
of known vulnerabilities published. For instance, the 
second quarter of 2007, US-CERTh report reported 
publishing information on 1,498 computer security 
vulnerabilities. Eighty-six of these were significant to the 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources sector, based 
on the types of software applications used in these 
environments. Thirteen were of high significance based 
upon the fact that these vulnerabilities represented 
substantial opportunities for attack against applications 
commonly used in the sector. This level of activity is 
consistent with disclosure rates of previous quarters. 
This report can be obtained through the Control Systems 
US-CERT Secure Portal or by specific email requests to 
cssp@dhs.gov.
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Appendix D—Acronyms & Definitions 
ACRONYMS
ACERT Army Computer Emergency Readiness Team 
AFCERT Air Force Computer Emergency Readiness Team  
AIC availability, integrity, and confidentiality 
CERT Computer Emergency Readiness Team 
CIA confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
CIAC Computer Incident Advisory Capability  
CI/KR Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources 
COTS commercial off-the-shelf 
CSSP Control System Security Program 
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
CVSSv2 Common Vulnerability Scoring System Version 2 
DCS distributed control system 
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DNS domain name services 
DOE Department of Energy 
FIRST Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams 
FTP File Transfer Protocol 
IAC integrity, availability, and confidentiality 
ICCP Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol—IEC 60870-6/TASE.2 
ICS industrial control system 
INL Idaho National Laboratory 
IRP Incident Response Plan 
IT information technology 
NVD National Vulnerability Database 
OEM original equipment manufacturer 
RTOS real-time operating system 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SO system operation 
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol 
US-CERT United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 
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GLOSSARY
Availability, Integrity and Confidentiality (AIC). AIC represents the typical priorities of ICS operations, 
where system availability and uptime has the highest priority at the expense of data integrity and 
confidentiality. 
Asset Owner. The owner and operator of industrial control systems. 
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA)/ availability, integrity, and confidentiality (AIC).
Traditional IT priorities where data confidentiality has the highest priority. Systems will be shutdown 
immediately to maintain data confidentiality at the expense of system integrity and availability. 
Common vulnerabilities and exposures. A diction of common names for publicly known information 
security vulnerabilities, while its common configuration enumeration provides identifiers for security 
configuration issues and exposures.  
Common Vulnerability Scoring System Version 2 (CVSSv2). An open framework for communicating the 
characteristics and impacts of IT vulnerabilities. 
Deployment. Refers to whether a vulnerable characteristic has been identified, readily available and can 
affect any part of the asset owners industrial control system. 
Exposure. Refers to what access is needed to attack the process control system; high exposure indicates 
the system is very easy to attack and low exposure indicates physical access would be required to 
attack the system. 
Hacker. A computer user who specializes in exploiting vulnerabilities in computer systems to obtain 
unauthorized access. 
Impact. The determination of what the impact is if an attacker is successful; high impact indicates the 
attacker gains full control; low impact indicates attacker gains limited rights (enough to cause a 
denial-of-service type attack). 
Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP) Network. The ICCP network is being specified by 
utility organizations throughout the world to provide data exchange over Wide Area Networks 
between utility control centers, utilities, power pools, regional control centers, and nonutility 
generators. ICCP is also an international standard known as IEC 60870-6/TASE.2. 
National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The U.S. Government repository of standards-based 
vulnerability management data. This data enables automation of vulnerability management, security 
measurement, and compliance (e.g., Federal Information Security Management Act).
RTOS (Real Time Operating System). Multitasking operating system intended for real-time applications 
such as programmable thermostats, robots, instrumentation controllers and scientific research systems 
(oscilloscopes). Typical designs have three states: running, ready, blocked.
Simplicity. The relative ease of technical exploitation. Readily available written scripts that utilize 
exploits that can be used by any computer user are considered a high risk. Exploits requiring 
significant technical skills by sophisticated users are rated a low risk. 
Threat. An identified person with the means, intent, and motivation to cause damage to a cyber system. 
